Economics and the new economy: the invisible hand meets creative destruction by Leonard I. Nakamura
Financial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
15





s the third millennium begins, the
buzzwords “new economy” and “new
paradigm” are invoked repeatedly to explain the
U.S. economy.  In general, these words refer to a
view that high-tech innovations and the global-
ization of world markets have changed our
economy enough that we need to think about it
and operate within it differently.  Perhaps what
we notice most is a new Zeitgeist of accelerating
change in the worlds of work and knowledge,
change that’s emphasized in books with titles
like Blur (Davis and Meyer) and Faster: The Accel-
eration of Just About Everything (Gleick).
Unsurprisingly, economists by no means agree
that there is a new economy or that there is a
need for a new paradigm.
One sign that there has been a fundamental
shift is that direct production of goods and ser-
vices no longer absorbs the preponderance of
workers’ time.  In 1975, production of goods and
services ceased being the occupation of the ma-
jority of U.S. workers.  Never before had a society
been so productive that it could afford to assign
most of its workers to white-collar tasks such as
management, paperwork, sales, and creativity.
As recently as 1900, production workers in
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goods and services accounted for 82 percent of
the U.S. workforce (Figure).1  Over the course of
the century, that number declined by large steps,
to 64 percent in 1950, and to 41 percent in 1999.
Managers, professionals, and technical work-
ers, who are increasingly involved in creative
activities, have risen from 10 percent of the
workforce in 1900 to 17 percent in 1950, to 33
percent in 1999.2
In 1999 the U.S. economy employed 7.6 mil-
lion professional creative workers — 2.3 million
engineers and architects, 2.9 million scientists,
and 2.4 million writers, designers, artists, and
entertainers.  At the start of the 20th century, this
Source: 1900-70 Historical Statistics of the United States.  1980, Census of
Population.  1990 and 1999, Employment and Earnings, January 1991 and
January 2000. Production occupations are defined here to include farm-
ing, forestry, and fishing; precision production, craft, and repair; opera-
tors, fabricators, and laborers; private household and other service work-
ers.  Sales and clerical workers include sales workers and administrative
support, including clerical workers. Managers, professionals, and tech-
nical workers include executive, administrative, and managerial work-
ers, professional specialty workers, and technical and related support
workers.
FIGURE
The Decline of Production Work
Major occupational categories as proportions
of total employment
1The 1998 occupational data
used here are from the Current
Population Survey of the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, published
in Employment and Earnings, and
the data for years before 1972 are
from the decennial U.S. Censuses
of Population as recorded in the
Historical Statistics of the United
States. Production occupations are
defined here to include farming,
forestry, and fishing; precision
production, craft, and repair; op-
erators, fabricators, and laborers;
and private household and other
service workers.
2Managers, professionals, and
technical (MPT) occupations in-
clude executive, administrative,
and managerial workers; profes-
sional specialty positions; and
technicians and related support.
The residual category of occupa-
tions is composed of sales and
administrative support, includ-
ing clerical. This sales and clerical
category rose from 8 percent of
the workforce in 1900 to 19.5 per-
cent in 1950 and grew more rap-
idly than MPT during that time.
It continued to grow more rap-
idly than MPT until it reached 25
percent in 1970.  Since then, how-
ever, the proportion of clerical and
sales workers has been relatively
stable; it amounted to 26 percent
in 1999. Much of the function of
these workers involves paper-
work, the processing of which has
been greatly automated in the
past 30 years.Financial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
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group numbered 200,000 workers — less than 1
percent of the 29.3 million workers then em-
ployed.  By 1950, the count had risen more than
five times to 1.1 million—almost 2 percent of the
total of 59 million workers.  There are now more
than six times as many creative professionals as
in 1950, representing 5.7 percent of the workforce
(Table).
These professional creative workers are paid
for their efforts primarily through property rights
to their creations: they (and the corporations that
employ them) are granted copyrights, patents,
brand names, or trademarks. These property
rights in turn create temporary exclusivity, tem-
porary monopoly power that negates the unfet-
tered access to markets so prized in economic
theory.
The clash between creativity and
traditional economics runs deep.
Perfect competition is the central
paradigm economists have relied on
to describe capitalist economies.  This
paradigm, which underlies Adam
Smith’s “Invisible Hand” theorem,
focuses on production processes and
abstracts from the informational
tasks that managers, professionals,
clerks, and sales workers perform.
The paradigm of perfect competition
was formulated by William S. Jevons,
Leon Walras, and Carl Menger in the
late 19th century, a time when direct
production of goods and services
dominated work.3  Is this paradigm
still appropriate in an age in which
innovation is such an important eco-
nomic activity; millions of workers
are employed in creative activities,
such as designing, inventing, and marketing new
products; and more and more economic activity
is devoted to creating technical progress?
In light of the changes summarized above,
perhaps the theory set forth by Joseph
Schumpeter and often referred to as creative de-
struction is a better paradigm for the current U.S.
economy. Paul Romer (1998), a Stanford profes-
sor of economics and one of the new
Schumpeterian theorists, uses the metaphor of
cooking to describe direct production as follow-
ing existing recipes while creativity is seen as
creating new recipes. The new recipes that result
from creative endeavors allow a higher standard
of living. But creative efforts are risky: while some
efforts will fail and yield little, if any, payoff, ef-
forts that yield successful new products are richly
3American economist Frank Knight is
generally credited with formalizing the
paradigm of perfect competition in the first
years of the 20th century. His book Risk,
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Sources: 1900-1980, Censuses of Population.  1990 and 1999,
Employment and Earnings, January 1991 and January 2000.
Professional creative workers consist of architects, engineers,
mathematical and computer scientists, natural scientists, so-
cial scientists and urban planners, writers, artists, entertainers,
and athletes.
Minor multiplicative adjustments have been made to exclude
teachers of dance, music, and art from the artists and entertain-
ers category in earlier years; teachers of all types are now sepa-
rated from artists and entertainers in the occupational statis-
tics.
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rewarded. Firms and workers whose products
are outmoded by the new products are harmed.
The unevenness of reward implies that an
economy that devotes a lot of its resources to
creative efforts may have greater inequality, as
well as a higher average standard of living, than
one that is less creative. And if creativity contin-
ues to increase in importance, inequality may
continue to rise in the long run, or at least may
not decline.
FOLLOWING EXISTING RECIPES:
THE WORLD OF THE INVISIBLE HAND
Ever since Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Na-
tions (1776), most economists have espoused the
view that a specific aspect of competition called
perfect competition is the main spur to economic
efficiency. In terms of the metaphor of recipes,
this type of competition requires that all firms in
an industry have access to the same set of reci-
pes. Let’s explore this idea to gain insight into
the standard demonstration of the Law of the
Invisible Hand.
A recipe for producing a good or a service has
a list of ingredients: quantities of inputs, includ-
ing the services of labor and capital, that go into
making the final product.  The desire to maxi-
mize profits induces each firm to produce the
product at the lowest possible cost — that is, to
use the recipe that allows the firm to produce the
good or service at minimum cost — given the
prices of ingredients.  If many firms compete,
and all of them can use the same recipes, no firm
can charge more than the lowest cost at which
all competing firms can make the product. If it
did, a competitor would offer the product at a
lower price and make a profit doing so. If prices
of inputs change, firms may adopt a different
recipe, but they will still seek to produce at low-
est cost, and competition will still force firms to
charge no more than the new lowest cost. Thus,
a consumer buys from firms that, in their own
self-interest, produce products as efficiently as
the consumer could wish and charge prices that
reflect the lowest possible production cost.
Guided by the invisible hand of the marketplace,
firms are led by self-interest to behave in a way
that maximizes each consumer’s well being —
so long as there is vigorous competition among
firms.  This is the Law of the Invisible Hand.
In general, Smith’s Law of the Invisible Hand
implies that government interference in the per-
fectly competitive economy is unnecessary ex-
cept for ensuring that monopoly does not arise.
If a firm can exclude other firms from its market,
thereby monopolizing a good, it will maximize
profits by restricting supply and charging more
than the cost of production. When that happens,
consumers buy less of the monopolized good
than they would at the lower price that competi-
tion would force firms to charge. The result is
that the economy will operate inefficiently: too
little of the monopolized good will be produced
and consumers will be worse off than they
would be if the good were produced competi-
tively. In this theory, monopoly is a primary threat
to the efficiency of a capitalist economy.
In some cases, however, a single producer may
yield the lowest cost way of producing a good or
service, perhaps because the cost of making an
additional unit of the good keeps falling as more
units are produced by a producer (economists
refer to this as scale economies). In such cases,
the government’s role is to regulate the mo-
nopoly so that it does not artificially restrict sup-
ply.
Smith’s theory also implies that governments
can assist the invisible hand by abolishing arti-
ficial barriers to trade.  This can force into com-
petition firms that otherwise might have mo-
nopolized small markets.  At the same time, larger
markets encourage individuals to specialize in
different parts of the production process and
coordinate their labor. In turn, specialization —
the division of labor — is the chief engine of in-
creased productivity. Division of labor, accord-
ing to Smith, owes its power to increase produc-
tivity to three sources: “first, to the increase of
dexterity in every particular workman; secondly,
to the saving of the time which is commonly lostFinancial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
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in passing from one species of work to another,
and lastly, to the invention of a great number of
machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and
enable one man to do the work of many” (p. 7).
Smith saw the inventive activity that improved
production techniques as being a byproduct of
the division of labor, since, when a worker con-
centrated attention on one activity, time-saving
inventions often came to mind. Of course, even
in the 18th century, when Smith was writing,
the activity of inventors and other creative work-
ers was evident in the economy, but the flow of
payments to creative work was minuscule com-
pared with those that flowed to the labor, land,
and capital that directly produced products.4
Smith saw progress in economic activity as
flowing naturally, almost magically, from wider
markets.  The theory of the invisible hand, as it
has evolved within modern economic growth
theory, treats both economies of scale and cre-
ative activity as exogenous, that is, outside the
scope of economic theory, and therefore “magi-
cal.”5  But an alternative perspective is to describe
economies of scale and technical progress as
endogenous to the economy, viewing creativity as
an economic activity.  This perspective on eco-
nomics found its foremost advocate in a Harvard
professor named Joseph Schumpeter, who wrote
in the first half of the 20th century, during the
years when formal corporate research and de-
velopment first emerged on a substantial scale.
CREATING NEW RECIPES: THE NEW
ECONOMY OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
Schumpeter argued that what really made
capitalism powerful was profits derived from
creativity.6  He believed that the force of habit
was extremely powerful in work life and that
since economic development required imple-
menting creativity, overcoming this inertia was
crucial.
In his masterwork, Capitalism, Socialism, and
Democracy (1942), Schumpeter constructed a
paradigm for economic theory in which creativ-
ity was the prime mover in a modern economy,
and profits were the fuel. He argued that what is
most important about a capitalist market system
is precisely that it rewards change by allowing
those who create new products and processes to
capture some of the benefits of their creations in
the form of short-term monopoly profits.7 Com-
petition, if too vigorous, would deny these re-
wards to creators and instead pass them on to
consumers, in which case firms would have scant
reason to create new products. These monopoly
profits provide entrepreneurs with the means to
(1) fund creative activities in response to per-
ceived opportunities; (2) override the natural
conservatism of other parties who must cooper-
ate with the new product’s launch as well as the
opposition of those whose markets may be
harmed by the new products; and (3) widen and
deepen their sales networks so that new prod-
ucts are quickly made known to a large number
of customers.8
4Smith ascribes this inventive activity to workers in
industries that make capital equipment.
5In his book Krugman uses the term magic to de-
scribe the exogenous sources of economic growth in a
nice exposition of this point of view.
6Good academic introductions to this point of view
are in the articles by Paul Romer (1986, 1990) and  the
book by Joseph Stiglitz. Romer (1998) is a good busi-
ness-oriented popular discussion. The book by Gene
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman is an advanced text.
7Schumpeter ignores the theoretical possibility that
new recipes can be developed and paid for using perfect
contracts, where the inventors are paid for their labor
and the recipes are then made available freely to all firms.
It appears that new consumer products cannot be readily
specified in advance, as such a perfect contract would
require.  The book by Stiglitz discusses evidence that
creative destruction is difficult to assimilate into a per-
fect contract world.
8Opposition to new products can arise from consumer
and political groups, from workers who make rival prod-
ucts within or outside the firm, or from potential dis-
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The drive to temporarily capture monopoly
profits promotes, in Schumpeter’s memorable
phrase, “creative destruction,” as old goods and
livelihoods are replaced by new ones.9  Thus,
while Adam Smith saw monopoly profits as an
indication of economic inefficiency, Joseph
Schumpeter saw them as evidence of valuable
entrepreneurial activity in a healthy, dynamic
economy.
Indeed, Schumpeter’s view was that new
products and processes are so valuable to con-
sumers that governments of countries should
encourage entrepreneurs by granting temporary
monopolies over intellectual property and other
fruits of creative effort.  Thus, in contrast to Adam
Smith, Schumpeter argued that government ac-
tion to prevent or dismantle monopolies might
harm growth and the consumer in the long
run. 10,11 In practice, temporary intellectual prop-
erty protection has been adopted by all advanced
industrial economies, suggesting that this re-
ward system is indeed valuable in promoting
economic growth. To this extent, modern econo-
mies have not obeyed the law of the invisible
hand. We have made monopoly, albeit tempo-
rary, an important instrument of national devel-
opment policy.12
On the other hand, the temporary monopoly
protections of intellectual property law are not
the only way modern societies reward innova-
tors.  For example, much scientific research is
generated by grants made by public agencies or
private foundations.  Development of military
products is often done for a fixed payment, which
is determined by a bidding process, or on the
basis of the incurred and audited costs of the
developer. However, these alternative reward
systems are employed only where a normal mar-
ket does not exist for the product.  For consumer
products, it appears that, in general, the market-
place is the best measure of the value of an in-
vention.  The more valuable the product, the
greater the reward to its creator should be. And
that’s exactly what a patent or copyright does —
gives the creator a reward that rises with con-
sumer value, because the greater a product’s con-
sumer value, the more profit a monopolist can
realize from its sales, since the monopolist can
charge more for it.13 At the same time, it remains
true that the temporary monopoly itself deprives
society of the full value of the creation, since to
tributors.  This opposition may be formal or informal,
legal or illegal.  Consider the recent worldwide opposi-
tion to genetically modified agricultural products or the
protests at the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Orga-
nization.
9The monopoly is only temporary; it lasts until a bet-
ter product comes along that drives out the old or until
the patent or copyright expires and others are able to
copy the idea or process and compete with the origina-
tor.   If the grant of monopoly were long-lived, the mo-
nopolist would have less incentive to create innovations
and might have the power to prevent potential competi-
tors from introducing innovations.
10Schumpeter’s book gloomily prophesied that capi-
talism itself would succumb to socialism because of the
intellectual disrepute into which economic theory had
plunged monopoly and monopolists, when these very
monopolists were the heroes of capitalism, properly un-
derstood.
11Schumpeter may have gone too far; entrenched mo-
nopolies can become the enemy of progress. The theoreti-
cal model in the article by Stephen Parente and Edward
Prescott shows that it is possible for entrenched existing
monopolies, such as state-protected employment in the
textile industry in India, to prevent the adoption of new,
superior technology when entrants have limited ability
to profit from the new technology.
12Mark Rose’s study of the development of English
copyright law illustrates the explicit balancing of the
property rights of the creator against the desirability of
limiting monopoly power.
13The theoretical basis for this, as well as modern
views of the underlying complexities, is laid out in the
article by Suzanne Scotchmer and the one by Francesca
Cornelli and  Mark Schankerman.  One important limita-
tion to the theoretical result is that it assumes away
patent races.Financial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
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secure their monopoly profits, firms limit sup-
ply.  Thus, the full value of the creation is real-
ized only when the monopoly ends.14 While
Schumpeterian theories tell us some form of in-
tellectual property protection for creators is de-
sirable, they do not yet tell us how much protec-
tion to award, for instance, how long patents
should last.
There are two important drawbacks to an
economy of creative destruction.  First, an
economy of creative destruction knows only one
pace — hectic. There is no way to know who
created something except for priority — who-
ever says or does it first.  Once something is dis-
covered, it is easy to copy. Someone who inde-
pendently creates something, but does so belat-
edly, does not get credit and does not share in
the reward. The rewards of creativity go to the
swiftest.  It is thus no accident that long hours
are a frequent correlate of creative activity.
Second, creative destruction, as its name im-
plies, involves risk and change.  Those whose
products are outmoded by a new product lose
their livelihoods.  Even those who create a new
product can predict but a small part of its conse-
quences. The forces that oppose creativity are
not irrational; they are the natural concerns of
economic participants as to how they will be
affected by creativity.
WHY ARE THE FORCES OPPOSING
CREATIVITY SO STRONG?
Why oppose change and growth in the
economy? Because of the riskiness of creating,
making, competing against, and buying new
products.15  All activities are at risk in an envi-
ronment of creative destruction.
Creativity Puts Existing Products At Risk.
One aspect of competition within the creative
destruction paradigm is what might be called
leapfrogging competition, but which economists
call a “quality ladder.”16  In this form of competi-
tion — which can be observed in video game
machines, personal microprocessors, computer
software, pharmaceuticals, cell phones, and
color televisions — companies try to create new
generations of the same product so that the bang
for the buck (in economic terms, quality-adjusted
value per dollar) rises.  A clear example is the
personal computer (PC), whose power and speed
have been rising at rapid rates for over 20 years.
In the competition to supply components of
the PC such as modems or memory, any firm
that wants to play the game has to invest in cre-
ating new, faster, and smaller versions of the com-
ponent.  To earn profits to justify this investment
and its uncertainties, the resulting innovation
must leapfrog the competition by creating a new
generation. The first firm to market with the new
generation can often grab the bulk of the entire
market and, with it, almost all the profits to be
had.  Of course, this typically wipes out the prof-
itability of the previous generation and sets the
stage for the next leapfrogger, who will then de-
stroy the profits of the current leader.
Another aspect of creative destruction is com-
petition across different types of products.  The
creation of a new type of product will, first and
foremost, increase the variety of products avail-
able to consumers.17  Beyond that, it will enhance
14Robert Hunt’s article is a good summary of theo-
retical and empirical evidence about the uncertainties of
optimal patent protection.
15Discussions of the impact of increasing risk and
inequality in the U.S. are found in the book by Robert
Frank and Philip Cook and the book by Michael Mandel.
16The pioneering article is the one by Philippe Aghion
and Peter Howitt. Grossman and Helpman’s book is a
nice exposition, albeit at an advanced level.  The compe-
tition being described is not easy to model mathemati-
cally because the firms engaged in this competition have
to worry about both the past and the future—the quali-
ties of existing products and the future products that
will be discovered—in calculating the likely profitability
of their investments.
17The seminal paper is the one by Avinash Dixit and
Stiglitz.
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the desirability of some kinds of products and
lower that of others, just as the automobile in-
creased the demand for rubber tires and gaso-
line and reduced the demand for horseshoes and
buggy whips.
More generally, new products encompass
both aspects — they can be seen both as quality
improvements and as different products that
widen the market. Consider new drugs like
Celebrex and Vioxx, improved versions of aspi-
rin that minimize the gastrointestinal side ef-
fects of long-term use of aspirin and aspirin sub-
stitutes.  These products have modestly reduced
the demand for aspirin, but because of their cur-
rent high price, their main effect has been to ex-
pand the market to those who have had adverse
reactions to aspirin and other aspirin substitutes.
Being Creative Is Inherently Risky. You don’t
know what will work until you try it. While suc-
cessful new products may earn immense returns,
others inevitably fail and cause losses to their
creators and their supporters. Every new prod-
uct is a step into the unknown.18  Recent ex-
amples of products that were expected to fare
well in the marketplace, but did not, include the
antibiotic Trovan and the 1998 remake of the
movie Godzilla. Trovan was expected to be a
multibillion dollar antibiotic.  Its launch in 1998
was a tremendous success: two million prescrip-
tions were written in a year. But of these users,
14 suffered severe liver damage as a side effect,
and several died.19  As a result, Trovan’s distri-
bution was limited to use in supervised settings
(that is, hospitals) in the United States, and the
European Union banned it outright.  Now Trovan
is no longer expected to be a blockbuster drug.
Similarly, among movies, the remake of Godzilla
was expected to be the summer blockbuster of
1998.  Instead, its sales were very disappoint-
ing.
Careers and Sequels. For individual scien-
tists and artists, past success is no guarantee of
future success. If we could pick winners, we
would give those who are going to be produc-
tive the resources they need, but often we recog-
nize talent only after the fact. After he published
his Principia, Newton’s scientific output essen-
tially disappeared. Computer laser typesetting
pioneer Wang Xuan, of Beijing University, was
quoted in Science magazine as lamenting, “When
I was in my prime, doing the most advanced
research, I was not recognized. [N]ow that my
creative peak has long passed...my fame grows
while I’m making fewer and fewer contribu-
tions.”20 This riskiness extends to those who
work with creators, because their continued
employment may depend on the success of the
creators. Some kinds of downsizing can be
viewed as the natural consequence of failed cre-
ativity, of the inability of a group to maintain a
stream of innovation.  Of course, in a world of
creative destruction, those who don’t even at-
tempt to innovate also get downsized. Workers
whose employment is attached to outmoded
methods of production or outmoded goods suf-
fer large penalties if they are unable to adapt to
change.
Networks and Risk. Another aspect of the
risk of creative destruction is the fact that con-
sumers also invest in a product or system.21 If
the product or system becomes outmoded, con-
sumers suffer along with the producer. Hence,
18The first economist to focus on the fundamental
uncertainties of creativity was Frank Knight, and in his
honor, this aspect of uncertainty is often called Knightian
risk. Because we cannot rely on new creativity to be like
past creativity, an empirical analysis of Knightian risk
will likely always be at least somewhat unsatisfactory.
It also implies that the confidence of investors (which
Keynes called their animal spirits) may be an important
determinant of the rate of investment.
19In clinical trials, 7000 patients were exposed to
Trovan and no cases of acute liver failure were reported.
(“Questions and Answers about TROVAN Advisory,”
FDA Medwatch, June 9, 1999.)
20Quoted in the section “Random Samples,” Science
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consumers also must try to pick winners.  This
effect becomes sharper when the number of con-
sumers investing in a given system influences
its value for each consumer, for example, the
more of your friends who have email, the more
useful email is to you.
Phonograph records suddenly became a risky
investment in the 1980s when compact discs took
the market. Compact discs offered enough ad-
vantages to ensure that new consumers would
want to switch to the new technology. Older con-
sumers had to bear switching costs, in particu-
lar, their existing collections of records and ste-
reo equipment became outmoded and new
records ceased to become widely available.
Betamax looked like a technology winner to
most experts when videocassette recorders
(VCRs) were invented in the late 1970s.  Beta
was competing with VHS, and insiders knew
that Sony had had the opportunity to develop
either Beta or VHS and had chosen Beta as the
superior technology. But the corporations that
developed VHS were able to more rapidly
lengthen videocassette playback times. Consum-
ers who did adopt Beta eventually found that
they had to switch to VHS, as Sony was forced to
abandon the system by the greater availability
of prerecorded videocassettes on VHS.
When consumers do choose a system, the
system’s rivals may suffer irreversible setbacks,
as the Beta system did.  This underscores the
risks of competition — network competition cre-
ates big winners and big losers.
In 1961, back in the early days of the com-
puter, when each piece of computer software was
written for a specific model of computer, IBM
decided to create an operating system that would
permit computer users to use the same programs
across the entire family of IBM computers. The
difficulty of creating such a system proved much
greater than expected, and IBM nearly failed
waiting for its completion in 1966 (see the book
by Thomas Watson). But once the system was
together and operating, IBM’s rivals in the com-
puter business were helpless — and virtually
all of their important customers migrated to this
new system that could grow as they did. Here
the “consumers” were large corporate users,
whose investments in software became much
more durable once they could be used unchanged
on different models of computers. IBM’s U.S. com-
petitors became known as the Seven Dwarfs.  IBM
dominated the worldwide computer market for
20 years thereafter.
The costs associated with the riskiness of cre-
ativity must be balanced against the gains ob-
tained.  Unfortunately, measuring the economic
gains due to new products is harder than mea-
suring those from more efficiently produced ex-
isting products.
CREATIVITY IS HARD TO VALUE
The investments that consumers make in us-
ing a product, or that firms make in new comple-
ments, make that product more valuable.  When
VCRs first came on the market, they were mainly
used to record television programs for playback
at a more convenient time. But as VCRs prolifer-
ated and were able to play longer tapes, they
became a convenient format for playing movies.
Businesses that rented prerecorded tapes to con-
sumers further enhanced the value of the VCR.
Similarly, the development of software and of
the Internet have further enhanced the value of
personal computers.
Because we learn about the true value of new
products only with experience, and because con-
sumers invest in new product systems only over
time — and in doing so enhance their value — it
takes a long time to know how valuable any
given piece of creativity is. The enthusiasm of
the moment — whether highbrow or lowbrow
— may not be what lasts. Samuel Johnson said
21Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian’s book gives a read-
able introduction to consumer network effects that have
been the focus of much economic research.  John Sutton’s
book discusses the general issue of consumer invest-
ments in a system.
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that a century was long enough to judge that
Shakespeare’s plays were indeed immortal.
Shakespeare himself thought that his sonnets
would last, but didn’t publish his plays.22  Yet
when Harold Bloom argues that Shakespeare
created the modern world, he’s citing the plays,
not the sonnets. Will Seinfeld be an important
source of humor for the 22nd century? Will John
Cage or John Lennon be seen as the more impor-
tant composer a century from now?
Not only is measuring the value of creativity
inherently difficult, but the task is made harder
because many of our measures implicitly assume
perfect competition.  The U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (1998) describes the classification of
products in the national income and product
accounts as follows: “Goods are products that
can be stored or inventoried, services are prod-
ucts that cannot be stored and are consumed at
the time of their purchase, and structures are
products that are usually constructed at the lo-
cation where they will be used and that typi-
cally have long economic lives.” This descrip-
tion appears to leave no room for intangible as-
sets, such as the copyright for Windows98 and
the patent for Viagra, that result from creative
endeavors. These assets are not material and are
thus unlike goods and structures, but they may
be long-lived, unlike services.  Under the theo-
retical ideal of the perfectly competitive economy,
intangible assets do not exist because the mo-
nopoly power they imply is ruled out. Put an-
other way, in a perfectly competitive economy,
because all recipes are freely available, no one
earns a profit from owning one.  A direct conse-
quence of the use of the invisible hand paradigm
is that the value of creativity disappears from
statistical view.
 The result is that creativity is poorly mea-
sured in the U.S. economy. Our official statistics
generally don’t treat creativity as an investment
(Nakamura, 1999a).  This in turn causes the sta-
tistics to understate nominal output, savings, and
profits. Retail innovations and the proliferation
of new products that result from creative activ-
ity have made it more difficult to measure the
inflation rate (Nakamura 1995, 1998, 1999b).
Indeed, our official statistics almost certainly
overstate inflation. The combination means that
our measures understate real economic growth
(Nakamura, 1997).
One of the anomalous features of the U.S.
economy is the slow rate of measured produc-
tivity growth since the mid-1970s, during this
period of intensive creativity.  In large part, the
reason for this anomaly is that the perfect com-
petition paradigm describes creativity as unim-
portant, and therefore, our economic statistics
tend to ignore it.
However, measures of U.S. economic growth
are in the process of being revised.  In the 1999
revision to the national income accounts, the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis raised the annual
growth rate during the period 1978 to 1998 from
2.6 percent to 3.0 percent. As a result of this
change, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has raised
its estimates of average growth in output per
hour in the nonfarm business economy from 1.1
percent to 1.5 percent per year. This change was
made primarily because the BEA recognized soft-
ware as an investment and also improved the
measures of financial sector output to reflect
product change — in both cases bringing in-
creased awareness of new products’ impact on
economic growth into the national accounts.
Until the process of revision of our statistical
structure is reasonably far along, it will be hard
for the economics profession to judge the em-
pirical validity of the paradigm of creative de-
struction. If there is to be a scientific paradigm
shift, then the creative destruction paradigm
must explain data better than the invisible hand
paradigm does. This in turn requires that the
fundamental measures that the economics pro-
22In Sonnet 18, Shakespeare promised his now for-
gotten patron that his verse would be immortal, “So long
as men can breathe or eyes can see, So long lives this, and
this gives life to thee.”Financial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
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fession uses to generate data be reformulated to
reasonably reflect the value of creativity, not only
for the current period but for the past.  If upon
doing so, we observe long-term acceleration of
productivity, this observation would provide
valuable empirical evidence that the creative
destruction paradigm is superior (Romer, 1986).
Moreover, if these arguments are correct, we
should then be able to describe the sources of
economic growth more precisely and convinc-
ingly.
Another point of difference between the in-
visible hand and creative destruction is a pre-
diction about the distribution of outcomes.  The
Law of the Invisible Hand suggests that compe-
tition between workers and companies will tend
to equalize wages, whereas creative destruction
suggests that markets may tend to magnify in-
equalities.
IN THE NEW ECONOMY, INEQUALITY
MAY BE ON THE RISE
Inequality and Productivity Growth in the
U.S.  Productivity growth in the U.S. has been
phenomenal if we look at long periods of time,
even using traditional measures of output.  Out-
put per hour has doubled every 30 to 40 years
for the past 120 years, leading to a standard of
living roughly 10 times higher than that just af-
ter the Civil War (see the book by Angus
Maddison). Even the poorest U.S. citizens are
far better off than in the distant past.
But over the past 20 years, inequality has risen
distinctly in the U.S., and creative destruction
appears to have had an important role in its in-
crease.  While very highly paid male workers
earned less than 2.5 times the pay of poorly paid
male workers (precisely, the worker at the 90th
percentile in earnings compared with one at the
10th percentile) in the 1960s and the early 1970s,
the multiple has since risen fairly steadily. Since
the mid-1990s, very highly paid male workers
have earned roughly four times what poorly paid
male workers earn.23  On average, workers at
companies that are engaged in creative activi-
ties — as measured by research and develop-
ment expenditures, investment in computers,
and on-the-job training — have earned more and
had greater income growth.
 The rapid technological change in this pe-
riod appears to have favored the highly educated
— those who are best prepared to create, to as-
sist in creativity, and to learn new ways of work-
ing to accommodate the resulting changes.24
Even though the supply of the highly educated
has risen rapidly, demand has outpaced sup-
ply, and the value of higher education has risen.
Quantitatively, the proportion of the working
population over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s
degree has gone up from 22 percent in 1979 to 31
percent in 1999. The median worker with a col-
lege degree earned 68 percent more a week than
the median worker with a high school degree in
1999, up from 29 percent in 1979.25
There is a clear and close connection between
the rising value of college education and the
rapid growth of managerial and professional
work that is increasingly centered on creativity.
A college degree is often required for these occu-
pations, and those who earn college degrees gen-
erally enter these occupations. As of March 1997,
62 percent of managers and professionals had
bachelor’s or advanced degrees. Conversely, 68
percent of all holders of bachelor’s or advanced
degrees were either managers or professionals.
At least some of the value imputed to a college
degree is likely to be a return to greater continu-
ing investment in knowledge; holders of college
degrees are much more likely than others to en-
23See the article by Peter Gottschalk.
24For the background to this argument, see the Sym-
posium on Wage Inequality in the Spring 1997 Journal of
Economic Perspectives, where articles by Gottschalk, George
Johnson, Robert Topel, and Nicole Fortin and Thomas
Lemieux present a variety of views on skill-biased tech-
nical change.
25Economic Report of the President, February 2000, U.S.
Government Printing Office, pp. 135-36.
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gage in formal education while working.
And inequality has risen substantially even
after we control for measurable changes in edu-
cation, demographics, and the growth of trade.26
If the U.S. economy continues to change as dy-
namically as it has in the recent past — and the
evidence on the proportion of the workforce de-
voted to creativity suggests that it will — there is
scant reason for supposing that inequality will
decline. Moreover, increases in inequality are
occurring not only within the United States but
also between the advanced industrial economies
and other countries.
Inequality in the World Economy. The para-
digm of perfect competition implies that inequal-
ity between rich and poor countries should fall
as barriers to trade fall. Opening up trade per-
mits countries to specialize more in the prod-
ucts they produce most efficiently. Allowing the
unhindered importing of capital lets poor coun-
tries adopt the technology of richer ones. Under
fairly general conditions, the wages of workers
and the return to capital in rich and poor coun-
tries will tend to become more similar. Workers
in less-developed countries should benefit more
than workers in developed countries as both
types of economies become more efficient and
relative wages of the workers in the less devel-
oped countries rise. As global trade increases,
average output per person should become less
disparate.27
But while global trade has increased, the evi-
dence on whether inequality has diminished is,
at best, equivocal. Output per worker among the
advanced industrial countries has tended to
converge, but over long periods of time, the gap
between the advanced countries and the less
developed countries has not generally dimin-
ished.  Output per worker throughout the world
has risen dramatically, as it has in the United
States, but there remain large pockets of poverty
in which households produce little more than
the bare minimum necessary for subsistence.
According to The World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators 2000, the 3.5 billion inhabit-
ants of the low-income countries had an aver-
age gross national product per person of $2,170
in 1998.28 The middle-income countries, with 1.5
billion inhabitants, averaged $5,990 per person
that year, while the high-income countries, with
0.9 billion inhabitants, averaged $23,420 per
person.  As a group, the richest countries gener-
ate 11 times as much gross national product per
person as the low-income countries.
By comparison, Lant Pritchett has argued that
in 1870, the income gap between the high-in-
come countries and the low-income countries
must have been less than nine times. While low-
income countries have experienced, on average,
a very substantial increase in income, so have
the high-income countries. The net result is that
worldwide inequality has not diminished over
the past 130 years. No doubt much of this in-
equality is the result of bad governance and bad
luck, including the rapacity of local oligarchs,
disease, war, colonial policy, and civil disorder.
This period of history includes extended peri-
ods during which trade barriers between nations
were quite high and rising, as well.
If we confine our observations to the period
since 1960, during which trade barriers around
the world have fallen, we also see relatively little
decline in income inequality.29  According to
Robert Summers and Alan Heston, gross domes-
26See the Symposium in the Journal of Economic Per-
spectives cited earlier.
27That international trade tends to increase both equal-
ity of returns and efficiency was put on a firm founda-
tion by  a series of economists beginning with David
Ricardo and continuing to the present.  See, for example,
the text by Wilfred Ethier.
28Product here is measured in terms of its purchasing
power in 1998 U.S. dollars.
29Trade barriers fell first under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and now under the auspices
of the World Trade Organization.Financial Modernization: Vastly Different or Fundamentally the Same? Edward G. Boehne
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tic product per person in 1960 in the high-in-
come countries was 10 times higher than it was
in the low-income countries. Thus, the 1998 ra-
tio of 11 times shows scant convergence even in
the recent period of trade liberalization.
Can we expect more rapid convergence in an
era in which economic value increasingly de-
pends on creative destruction? Consider the ad-
vantages the United States has vis-a-vis a less
developed country in the race to create. The U.S.
has a well-educated, diverse, and disciplined
workforce; access to the most recent research; a
deregulated economy relatively unencumbered
by bureaucratic restrictions; moderate taxes; a
smoothly functioning financial market to finance
investment; a long history of rule by law and
democracy; a military under firm civilian con-
trol; and a host of highly innovative corpora-
tions. These absolute advantages count for a great
deal in the world of creative destruction, where
speed, flexibility, and advanced education all
count in developing new products and bringing
them rapidly to the marketplace. Indeed, to the
extent that creative individuals and firms ben-
efit from geographic proximity, the direct eco-
nomic benefits of successful creativity will tend
to be concentrated in the most advanced coun-
tries.
The United States will have these advantages
whether or not the less developed countries par-
ticipate in globalization. Even so, in the long run,
less developed countries benefit from the im-
proved ability of the world economy to provide
new recipes. But the benefits of globalization
should not be oversold.  In the short run, rapid
obsolescence will tend to deter adoption of new
technology in nations where indigenous mar-
kets are small. And less developed countries will
find it difficult to emulate — and are not allowed
by the rules of intellectual property protection to
copy — the development of new products.  The
paradigm of creative destruction implies — in
all probability — persistent or even rising in-
equality between countries.
HOW TO THINK ABOUT A CHANGE
IN PARADIGM FOR ECONOMICS
What should the fundamental paradigm of
economics be: creative destruction or the invis-
ible hand?  This is an empirical matter that de-
pends on the importance of creativity. It is, in-
deed, hard to measure creativity precisely. But if
we fail to recognize it in our economic theory or
in our economic measures, we are doomed to be
precisely wrong rather than approximately cor-
rect. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
made this point when he said, “But the essential
fact remains that even combinations of very
rough approximations can give us a far better
judgment of the overall cost of living than would
holding to a false precision of accuracy and
thereby delimiting the range of goods and ser-
vices evaluated. We would be far better served
following the wise admonition of John Maynard
Keynes that ‘it is better to be roughly right than
precisely wrong.’”30
How should economists and noneconomists
think about the possibility of a paradigm shift in
economics?  British Nobel laureate economist
John Hicks took up this topic in his 1983 paper
on “revolutions” in economics:
“Our special concern [in economics] is with
the fact of the present world; but before we
can study the present, it is already past.  In
order that we should be able to say useful
things about what is happening, before it is
too late, we must select, even select quite vio-
lently.  We must concentrate our attention, and
hope that we have concentrated it in the right
place.
“Our theories, regarded as tools of analy-
sis, are blinkers in this sense.  Or it may be
politer to say that they are rays of light, which
illuminate a part of the target, leaving the rest
in the dark.  As we use them, we avert our
30Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan before the
Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, March 4, 1997.
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eyes from things that may be relevant. ...But it
is obvious that a theory which is to perform
this function satisfactorily must be well cho-
sen; otherwise it will illumine the wrong things.
Further, since it is a changing world that we
are studying, a theory which illumines the right
things now may illumine the wrong things
another time. This may happen because of
changes in the world (the things neglected may
have grown relative to the things considered)
or because of changes in our sources of infor-
mation (the sorts of facts that are readily ac-
cessible to us may have changed) or because
of changes in ourselves (the things in which
we are interested may have changed). There
is, there can be, no economic theory which
will do for us everything we want all the time.”
Put succinctly, Hicks argues that economic
science must adapt to the nature of the economy.
The growing importance of creative endeavors
appears to be what’s new in the New Economy.
If so, the New Economy represents a significant
change in the nature of the U.S. economy, one
that is difficult to align with the paradigm of
perfect competition. The New Economy is highly
competitive, but creative destruction, not produc-
tion, is the center of the competition. This im-
plies, in line with Hicks’s views, that for under-
standing the New Economy, Joseph Schum-
peter’s creative destruction paradigm may be
superior to Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
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